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theories driving economic policy in recent years—calls for fiscal 
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enhancing areas. The Project will put forward innovative 
policy ideas from leading economic thinkers throughout the 
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ideology and doctrine—to introduce new, sometimes 
controversial, policy options into the national debate with  
the goal of improving our country’s economic policy.
The Project is named after Alexander Hamilton, the 
nation’s first treasury secretary, who laid the foundation 
for the modern American economy.  Consistent with the 
guiding principles of the Project, Hamilton stood for sound 
fiscal policy, believed that broad-based opportunity for 
advancement would drive American economic growth, and 
recognized that “prudent aids and encouragements on the 
part of government” are necessary to enhance and guide 
market forces.
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 Abstract
The current housing and financial crisis has led to significant congressional and executive 
action to manage the crisis and stem the harms from it, but the fundamental problems that 
caused the crisis remain largely unaddressed. The central features of the industrial organi-
zation of the mortgage market with its misaligned incentives, and the core psychological 
and behavioral phenomena that drive household financial decisionmaking remain.  While 
the causes of the mortgage meltdown are myriad and the solutions likely to be multifac-
eted, a central problem that led to the crisis was that brokers and lenders offered loans 
that looked much less expensive and much less risky than they really were—and borrowers 
took them. It is time for common-sense reform to the mortgage market. This paper devel-
ops a new framework for understanding the mortgage markets as the interaction between 
individuals with specific psychological biases and firms that respond to those psychologies 
within specific markets. We argue that regulation needs to take account of that interaction. 
Our new framework leads us to propose a sticky opt-out mortgage system, under which lend-
ers would be required to offer borrowers loans with standard terms. Borrowers could opt 
out for other loans, but only after heightened disclosure requirements, and lenders would 
face increased exposure to liability or other sanctions.
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The housing crisis that we face today, driven by serious problems in the subprime and al-ternative home mortgage-lending markets—
problems now spreading to the prime mortgage 
market and beyond—suggests that our system of 
home mortgage regulation is seriously deficient 
and must be reformed. Many market-based systems 
designed to ensure sound practices in this sector, 
such as broker reputational risk, lender oversight of 
brokers, investor oversight of lenders, rating agency 
oversight of securitizations, and so on, simply did 
not work. Conflicts of interest, inadequate capital 
rules, lax regulation of key players, and boom times 
covered up the abuses—at least for a while, at least 
for those not directly affected. But no more.
We argue that we should take this opportunity to 
implement common-sense reforms to the mortgage 
market, to reduce the likelihood that such a crisis 
will occur again. Some change is already occurring. 
Market participants have been adjusting their poli-
cies. The Federal Reserve and the administration 
have pursued monetary and fiscal levers and have 
taken unprecedented steps to take over, bail out, or 
shore up private financial institutions. The FDIC 
has led the way with innovative reforms in banking 
supervisory policies, and the Federal Reserve has 
recently revamped its disclosure rules. Congress 
has passed important legislation to help provide an-
other option for the refinancing of defaulting mort-
gages and to help communities with the fallout.
But the fundamental problems that caused this cri-
sis remain largely unaddressed by these measures, 
which are largely focused on containing the current 
crisis. The central features of the industrial organi-
zation of the mortgage market with its misaligned 
incentives, the core psychological biases that drive 
household decisionmaking, and the constrained 
regulatory choice set available to policymakers all 
remain. While the causes of the mortgage crisis are 
myriad and the solutions to the crisis likely to be 
multifaceted, a central problem that led to the cri-
sis was that brokers and lenders offered loans that 
looked much less expensive and much less risky 
than they really were, in part because of low initial 
monthly payments and hidden costly features. As 
our friend Ned Gramlich once put it, “Why are the 
most risky loan products sold to the least sophis-
ticated borrowers?” (Gramlich 2007, p. 11). And 
homeowners took those loans, with grave personal 
and national consequences.
Choosing a mortgage is one of the largest finan-
cial decisions an American consumer will make, yet 
it can be a complicated one, especially today, with 
mortgages that vary in dimensions and unique fea-
tures. This complexity has raised regulatory issues. 
Should some features be regulated? Should product 
disclosure be regulated? And most basic of all, is 
there a rationale for regulation or will the market 
solve the current crisis and provide the basis for 
sound lending in the future? Current regulation of 
home mortgages is largely stuck in two competing 
models—disclosure, and usury or product restric-
tions. The current crisis suggests that a different 
approach might be warranted. This paper uses in-
sights from both psychology and economics to con-
struct a framework for understanding both models 
and to suggest a fundamentally new perspective.
In response to the complexity of our financial sys-
tem, there has been a long-running debate about the 
appropriate role and form of consumer regulation, 
largely revolving around two poles of thought: one 
focused on disclosure, the other on product restric-
tions. Disclosure regulation, embodied in the Truth 
in Lending Act (TILA), presumes one market fail-
ure: the market will fail to produce a clear and com-
parable disclosure of essential product information 
needed by consumers. TILA potentially responds 
to two concerns. First, firms will not reveal all in-
formation that borrowers should understand and 
analyze to make determinations regarding taking 
1. Introduction
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 out a loan. Second, firms will not reveal information 
in a way to facilitate comparability across products. 
The first concern speaks to consumer knowledge, 
solving the problem of inadequate information dis-
closure through the required provision of informa-
tion; the second concern addresses consumers’ abil-
ity to process the information, solving the problem 
of lack of comparability through coordination of 
terms and definitions.
Though it presumes one form of market failure—
the lack of comparable and full disclosure—homo 
economicus is very much the intellectual basis for 
disclosure regulation: the model relies on fully ra-
tional agents who make intelligent choices. But em-
pirical research on behavior, grounded in advances 
in psychology, suggests that these neoclassical as-
sumptions are misplaced and in many contexts con-
sequential. In particular, the availability of data does 
not always lead to communication and knowledge, 
understanding and intention do not necessarily lead 
to action, and contextual nuances can lead to poor 
choices. Individuals consistently make choices that, 
they themselves agree, diminish their own well-be-
ing in significant ways.
In contrast to disclosure regulation, usury laws and 
product restrictions start from the idea that certain 
prices or products are inherently unreasonable and 
that consumers need to be protected from making 
bad choices. Product regulation may diminish, in 
some contexts, access to credit or may reduce inno-
vation of financial products, however. Moreover, for 
certain types of individuals some limitations may 
themselves increase consumer confusion regarding 
what rules apply to which products, and what prod-
ucts may prove beneficial or harmful. In addition, 
firms will likely develop ways around such product 
restrictions, undermining their core intention, in-
creasing costs, and confusing consumers.
We explore a different approach, one based on in-
sights from behavioral economics on the one hand 
and an understanding of industrial organization on 
the other. At the core of our analysis is the inter-
action between individual psychology and market 
competition. This view is in contrast to the classic 
model, which relies on the interaction between ra-
tional choice and market competition. Because ra-
tional agents choose well, firms compete to provide 
products that improve welfare. Because rational 
agents process information well, firms compete to 
provide information that improves decision quality. 
By contrast, in our model individuals depart from 
neoclassical assumptions in predictable ways. The 
introduction of richer psychology complicates the 
impact of competition: firms compete based on 
how actual individuals will respond to products in 
the marketplace, and actual competitive outcomes 
may not always and in all contexts closely align with 
increasing consumer welfare.
In the home mortgage market, the standard model 
assumes that people evaluate options well and that 
the more options people have, the better. Firms will 
thus provide more options, people will pick the best 
among them, and healthy competition will drive 
out bad options. In reality, people are easily over-
whelmed by too many options and make mistakes, 
often in predictable ways. Borrowers, for example, 
might pick the most salient dimension (lowest 
monthly cost) rather than focusing on the long-
term cost of credit—or on the fact that taxes and 
insurance will not be escrowed and are not included 
in the monthly cost. Consequently, firms can and 
will introduce options that cater to these behaviors, 
and people will pick options that carry a greater 
likelihood of failure than anticipated, and which 
they themselves would find suboptimal on further 
reflection and analysis. These behavioral consider-
ations suggest that disclosure of information alone 
will often be insufficient to provide consumers with 
what is needed to optimize their understanding, de-
cisionmaking, and the resulting outcomes.
Our work is clearly related to the emerging litera-
ture on behaviorally informed policymaking. This 
literature produces novel considerations in the de-
sign and implementation of regulation, including 
features such as the framing of information, the set-
ting of defaults or “opt-out” rules, the provision of 
warnings, and other strategies to alter individual be-
An Opt-Out HOme mOrtgAge SyStem
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havior.1 In this paper, we embed this thinking more 
deeply in the logic of markets. Specifically, we adopt 
a framework that takes into account firm incentives 
to respond to behaviorally motivated regulation. 
We envision outcomes as an equilibrium interac-
tion between individuals with specific psychologies 
and firms that respond to those psychologies within 
specific market contexts. To the extent that the in-
teractions produce outcomes that are not socially 
optimal and produce real harms, regulation could 
be devised to address failures in this equilibrium.
This perspective reveals two dimensions to consid-
er. First, the psychological biases of individuals can 
either help or hurt the firms with which they inter-
act; hence firms’ and a publicly minded regulator’s 
interests are sometimes aligned and sometimes not. 
Let us take the example of a consumer who does not 
understand the profound effects of the compound-
ing of interest. Such a bias would lead the individ-
ual both to undersave and to overborrow. Society 
would prefer that the individual did not have such a 
bias in both contexts. Firms, however, would prefer 
that the individual not have the bias to undersave 
so that funds available for investment and fee gen-
eration would not diminish (abstracting from fee 
structures). Under common real-world conditions, 
however, firms would be perfectly content to see 
the same individual overborrow (abstracting from 
collection costs). Because people are fallible and 
easily misled, transparency does not always pay off 
and firms sometimes have strong incentives to ex-
acerbate psychological biases (see, e.g., Gabaix and 
Laibson 2006). Regulation in this case faces a much 
more difficult challenge than in the savings situa-
tion. The market response to individual failure can 
profoundly affect regulation. In attempting to boost 
participation in 401(k) retirement plans, the regula-
tor generally faces at worst indifferent and at best 
positively inclined employers seeking to boost em-
ployee retention and to comply with federal pen-
sion rules.2 In forcing disclosure of hidden prices of 
credit, by contrast, the regulator often faces nonco-
operative firms whose interests are to find ways to 
work around or to undo interventions.
A second implication of our equilibrium model of 
firms in particular markets interacting with indi-
viduals with specific psychologies is that the mode 
of regulation chosen should take account of this 
interaction. To explore this interaction, one might 
think of the regulator as holding two different types 
of levers: (1) changing the rules of the game, and 
(2) changing the scoring.3 When forcing disclosure 
of the APR, for example, the regulator effectively 
changes one kind of rule of the game—what a firm 
must say. A stronger form of rule change is product 
regulation: changing what a firm must do. Behav-
ioral rule changes, such as creating a favored start-
ing position or default, falls between these two types 
of rule changes (disclosure and product regulation). 
A default seeks to change what a firm does or says 
by changing the starting position for the interac-
tion between firms and individuals. Conversely, 
when changing liability or providing tax incentives, 
the regulator changes the way the game is scored. 
Typically, changing the rules of the game (without 
changing the scoring, as through liability changes) 
maintains the firms’ original incentives to help or 
hurt consumers based on their biases, channeling 
the incentive into different behaviors by firms or 
individuals, whereas changing the scoring of the 
game can alter those incentives.
This perspective highlights the care that must be 
taken when transferring the insights of prominent 
1.  These strategies have been called variously asymmetric paternalism, libertarian paternalism, and debiasing through law. See, e.g., Camerer, 
Issacharoff, Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin (2003), Thaler and Sunstein (2008), and Jolls and Sunstein (2005).
2.  We recognize that there are significant compliance issues regarding pensions and retirement plans, disclosure failures, fee churning, and
 complicated and costly fee structures, conflicts of interest in plan management, as well as problems with encouraging employers to
 sign up low-wage workers for retirement plans. We do not mean to suggest that these failings are trivial—far from it. We only mean
 to suggest that, as a comparative matter, market incentives to overcome psychological biases in order to encourage saving are more
 aligned with optimal social policy than with market incentives to exacerbate psychological biases to encourage borrowing.
3.  We use this bimodal framework of regulatory choice to simplify the exploration of how our model of individual psychology and firm
 incentives affects regulation. We acknowledge that the regulatory choice matrix is more complex (see Barr 2005b).
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 behavioral regulatory successes, such as defaults in 
401(k) participation, to other domains that might 
differ in nuanced but policy-relevant ways. In con-
trast to classical analyses, which impute substantial 
planning and control to individuals, numerous stud-
ies of savings among middle-class households have 
shown that savings works best as a default. Madrian 
and Shea (2001), for example, studied several plans 
that changed the default so that employees who fail 
to take action are automatically enrolled into the re-
tirement savings plan. They consistently found that 
saving for retirement increased dramatically as the 
default was changed to automatic enrollment. In a 
similar vein, Thaler and Benartzi (2004) document 
increased savings as a result of agreeing to default 
deductions from future raises.
According to the present analysis, changing the 
rules on retirement saving (by introducing defaults) 
works well because employers’ incentives align (or 
do not misalign) with regulatory efforts to guide 
individual choice. In other words, under current 
conditions employers are either unaffected or may 
even be hurt by individuals’ propensity to undersave 
in 401(k) plans.4 They thus will not lean against an 
attempt to fix that problem (undersaving). In other 
applications, such as where firms’ incentives mis-
align with regulatory intent, changing the rules 
alone may not work well since firms may have the 
ability to work creatively around those rule changes 
and seek to exploit individual biases in new ways. In 
such circumstances, liability rules may need to be al-
tered as well. Interestingly, such circumstances may 
lead to regulations that, though deeply motivated 
by behavioral insights, are not themselves particu-
larly psychological in nature.
In the next section, we discuss disclosure and prod-
uct regulation, which are the two dominant models 
of consumer protection in credit markets. We then 
explore behavioral insights that suggest the fragility 
of relying on the rational actor model to develop 
policy and discuss the realities of industrial organi-
zation of the home mortgage market that constrain 
policymakers. In that discussion, we develop our 
equilibrium model of human behavior and market 
reaction and analyze the implications of that model 
for regulatory choice. Finally, we introduce our al-
ternative: behaviorally informed home mortgage 
regulation. We then illustrate this approach with a 
proposal for a sticky opt-out home mortgage sys-
tem.
In brief, under our proposal lenders would be re-
quired to offer eligible borrowers a standard mort-
gage (or set of mortgages) such as a fixed-rate 
self-amortizing thirty-year mortgage according to 
reasonable underwriting standards. Lenders would 
be free to charge whatever interest rate they wanted 
on the loan, and, subject to the constraints outlined 
below, could offer whatever other loan products 
they wanted to offer. Borrowers would receive the 
standard mortgages offered unless they chose to 
opt out in favor of another option, after the lend-
er’s honest and comprehensible disclosures about 
the risks of the alternative mortgages. An opt-out 
mortgage system would mean borrowers would be 
more likely to receive straightforward loans they 
could understand.
But an opt-out policy on its own is likely to be inad-
equate because firms often have an incentive to hide 
the true costs of borrowing. Given the strong mar-
ket pressures to deviate from the default offer, we 
would need to require more than a simple opt out 
to make the default sticky enough to make a differ-
ence in outcomes. Thus, we propose that deviation 
from the offer would require heightened disclosures 
and additional legal exposure for lenders in order to 
make the default sticky. Lenders would have stron-
ger incentives to provide meaningful disclosures to 
those whom they convince to opt out because they 
4.  This negative effect on employers when workers undersave largely occurs because of the existing regulatory framework: pension regula-
tion gives employers incentives to enroll lower-income individuals in 401(k) programs. Absent this, it is likely that firms would be happy 
to discourage enrollment since they often must pay the match for these individuals. This point is interesting because it suggests that even 
defaults in savings only work because some other regulation changed the scoring of the game.
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would face heightened regulatory scrutiny, as well 
as increased costs if the loans did not work out (that 
is, if the borrower defaults on the loan).
Let us also say up front: the problem we identify 
regarding lender incentives to take advantage of 
consumer biases is not a specific function of the his-
torical period leading up to the current crisis. Rath-
er, it is a pervasive problem requiring a long-run 
solution. In the current crisis, the perverse incen-
tive we identify for firms to induce overborrowing 
seems obvious, at least in retrospect, because loan 
securitizations often left originators with no credit 
risk. Going forward, the market will likely correct 
this incentive problem and ensure originators are 
left with credit risk. Even if such corrections oc-
cur, we outline below two reasons for further regu-
lation. First, financial innovation is pervasive and 
future innovations may generate different kinds of 
incentive misalignment. Market generated incen-
tive alignment is a particularly thin reed to build 
a regulatory framework upon, particularly when, 
as we show, plausible regulatory alternatives exist 
that provide a safety net when incentives are not 
perfectly aligned. Second, while the popular focus 
has been on defaults, they are not the only measure 
of bad outcomes for borrowers, or for society.  In-
centive alignment only guarantees that lenders in-
ternalize the cost of defaults. Nothing prevents the 
market from offering products in which households 
overborrow.5 For example, a household struggling 
to make ends meet with excessive debt, but making 
it, may suffer hidden costs of borrowing—such as 
foregoing retirement or college savings—will not 
be internalized by lenders. Moreover, a borrower 
over-indebted on her mortgage might default on 
her credit card debt, imposing costs on other lend-
ers rather than on the mortgage originator. Thus, 
our proposal continues to be relevant even if the 
market has learned its lessons from the recent cri-
sis. 
5.  The key here is the possibility that consumers can make bad choices. In a rational model, consumers would not overborrow in a way that 
hurts them. In a behavioral model, they can, and regulation (such as what we propose) may be needed to prevent such mistakes if they are 
pervasive and serious enough, and cause widespread harm.
An Opt-Out HOme mOrtgAge SyStem
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Existing home mortgage regulation generally encompasses disclosure regulation and prod-uct regulation models. Both models overlook 
the interaction between individual psychology and 
market structure.
Consumer-Oriented Disclosure regimes
Consumer-oriented disclosures are designed to im-
prove consumers’ ability to shop for products and 
services. The theory is that information in credit 
markets is imperfect, firms lack sufficient incentives 
to coordinate to reveal comparable information, and 
disclosures lower the cost of acquiring more infor-
mation. More information, if comparable, should 
help consumers negotiate better. This in turn leads 
to more competition and a more efficient market. 
TILA embodies this approach. Under TILA, credi-
tors must reveal in a conspicuous and clear manner 
the APR and other key costs of credit.
Two essential problems emerge with consumer-
oriented disclosure regimes such as TILA. First, 
behavioral research teaches the pitfalls of relying 
on consumer understanding to influence consumer 
behavior; second, many transactions in the finan-
cial marketplace involve both complicated legal 
rules and complicated product structures that even 
financially sophisticated parties do not fully under-
stand. Empirical evidence suggests that consumers 
have a hard time understanding credit disclosures, 
and research in behavioral economics confirms that 
often consumers do not act on available informa-
tion (see, for example, Kling, Mullainathan, Shafir, 
Vermeulen and Wrobel 2008). If consumers are un-
likely to understand a financial transaction and in 
many cases are unlikely to behave fully rationally 
even in the face of disclosed information, then re-
lying on disclosure alone to address information 
asymmetries may be an ineffectual response. Still, 
disclosure might be improved based on behavioral 
research (e.g., Camerer et al. 2003, pp. 1211, 1230–
37; Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler 1998).
TILA requires disclosures to consumers regarding 
the cost of loans.6 This type of disclosure seeks to 
remedy asymmetric information and improve mar-
ket competition and efficiency through price dis-
closure, which would make it easier to comparison 
shop.7 TILA disclosure most likely improves trans-
parency and thus efficiency in the market, even if not 
all consumers understand the disclosures (Schwartz 
and Wilde 1979, p. 630). Yet we should be concerned 
not only with an efficient market in the aggregate, 
but also with efficiency within markets serving low- 
and moderate-income households and with the 
consequences of inadequate disclosures for affected 
consumers. Although TILA facilitates consumer 
comparison shopping, in some cases too much in-
formation is given to consumers and in other cases 
too little. Even outside the subprime market, there 
is little reason to think that consumers understand 
most aspects of mortgage transactions.8 Decision 
research suggests a need for simplicity: individuals 
faced with complex problems often simplify them 
to one or two basic decisions (e.g., Baron 2000, pp. 
43–68; Hogarth 1980, pp. 4–6; Plous 1993, pp. 107–
88). The need for simplicity conflicts, however, with 
2. the existing Structure of Home mortgage Credit market 
regulation
6. See, for example, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226.17 (2001).
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000), which states “The Congress finds that . . . competition among the various financial institutions and
 other firms engaged in the extension of consumer credit would be strengthened through informed use of credit. [Furthermore, i]t
 is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare
 more readily the various credit terms available to him.” See also Engel and McCoy (2002, pp. 1255, 1280–81), who describe
 opportunities that information asymmetries provide for predatory lenders and brokers. See also Schwartz and Wilde (1979, pp.
 630, 635).
8. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (1998), which notes
 consumers’ difficulties in understanding mortgage terms with or without disclosure.
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the goal of producing comprehensive disclosures 
that permit consumers to comparison shop based 
on the real price of multiattribute loans.
In addition, borrowers may trust mortgage bro-
kers to give them full and accurate information 
and to offer them the best loan product. Yet it is 
in the broker’s interest to offer the borrower the 
highest-rate loan that the broker can convince 
the borrower to accept. Brokers earn higher-yield 
spread premiums for placing borrowers into more-
expensive loans even if the borrower qualifies for 
a lower-cost alternative. Even in competitive re-
tail consumer markets for simple products, price 
dispersion can persist (Carlton and Perloff 2000, 
pp. 437–41). In home mortgage transactions, bor-
rower understanding of complicated terms is likely 
to be much lower, so price dispersion is likely to 
be higher, than in markets for simple products. 
Transactions for home mortgages present an even 
greater possibility for price differentials based on 
race, sophistication, ability to shop for better terms, 
or other factors (Jackson and Burlingame 2007, p. 
63).9 Moreover, with credit scoring, creditors know 
whether borrowers qualify for less-expensive loans 
under the lenders’ pricing schedules, but most bor-
rowers do not realize that they so qualify.10 
Unfortunately, TILA is extraordinarily complex.11 
The efficacy of disclosures is diminished by inad-
equacies in the nature and timing of disclosures, 
their limited effect on consumer behavior, and con-
sumers’ cognitive, emotional, and behavioral limi-
tations (Eskridge 1984, pp. 1128–30). In fact, TILA 
disclosures may not actually be noticed, read, or 
understood (Renuart 2003, pp. 421, 432), and may 
inundate the consumer with too much information 
to process (Eskridge, pp. 1133–35; Landers and 
Rohner 1979, pp. 722–25). Moreover, low-income 
and minority buyers are the least likely to shop 
for alternative financing arrangements. As a result, 
these problems regarding the efficacy of disclosure 
are likely exacerbated in the subprime market (e.g., 
Hogarth and Lee 2000).
TILA plays an important role in improving credit 
markets, and reforms would most likely contribute 
to improvements in credit markets. The current 
structure of the home mortgage market, however—
at least for those borrowing from subprime lend-
ers—suggests that disclosure will not be enough. 
In addition, financial education can play a role in 
helping consumers understand disclosures better, 
but expenditures for financial education lead to 
strong externalities. As a result, it is quite difficult 
to induce private market participants to offer finan-
cial education to the borrowing public at anything 
close to the scale it would take to make a difference. 
Furthermore, most empirical research on financial 
education concludes that its effect on real outcomes 
is typically quite modest (Caskey 2006). This may 
be caused at least in part by a behavioral tension, 
pitting intention against action, which we discuss 
below in the section on psychology and industrial 
organization.
product regulation
Alongside disclosure, governments historically have 
delineated the terms and conditions of some finan-
cial service products. Usury laws are the most com-
mon form of such restrictions. In economic terms, 
one might argue in favor of usury laws to block the 
granting of credit at high interest rates because the 
implied default rates would pose unacceptable so-
cial externalities. The concern with usury laws is 
that they often result in credit constraints on poor 
(or even middle-income) households that could 
otherwise afford and benefit from credit. Usury 
laws may also drive lending underground to loan 
9. Ayres (2001, pp. 19–44) has documented similar price discrimination in automobile sales and other markets.
10. Credit reports and credit scores are now available to borrowers on request. See Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub.
 L. 108-159, §§ 211–12, 117 Stat. 1952, (2003): 1968–69, codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. (2003), § 1681. 
11. See, for example, Emery v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 71 F. 3d 1343, 1346 (7th Cir. 1995), which describes the ineffectiveness of TILA in
 conveying relevant information and concludes, “so much for the Truth in Lending Act as a protection for borrowers.” See also Durkin
 (2002, pp. 201, 208, and Table 9), which found that 75 percent of respondents agreed either somewhat or strongly that TILA credit card
 disclosures are complicated.
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 sharks, precluding the possibility of effective con-
sumer protection regulation.
Another type of product regulation excludes cer-
tain types of loan terms or sales practices. Such 
restrictions often have two intertwined motiva-
tions. On the one hand, restrictions on loan terms 
can enhance price disclosure and competition by 
focusing borrowers and creditors on the price of 
credit rather than on other features of the loan that 
consumers may ill understand. On the other hand, 
product restrictions may be thought of as a substan-
tive judgment that certain loan terms are inherently 
unreasonable. In either event, product restrictions 
are based on the notion that consumers cannot fully 
understand or act in their own best interests in the 
face of confusing terms or transactions, or of decep-
tive sales practices to promote these unreasonable 
terms. Moreover, in this view competition alone is 
insufficient to drive out such practices.
For example, Congress enacted the Home Owner-
ship Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) in 1994 to re-
spond to unscrupulous lending practices in the sub-
prime home equity mortgage market.12 For some 
high-cost loans, HOEPA imposes restrictions on 
certain contract provisions, requires enhanced dis-
closures, and enhances remedies for violations. In 
addition to product regulation, HOEPA requires, 
directly and indirectly, enhanced disclosures for 
borrowers facing high-cost loans. Directly, HO-
EPA enhances disclosure by requiring creditors 
to disclose mortgage terms three days before clos-
ing. Indirectly, HOEPA product restrictions ought 
to drive more of the cost of the loan into the APR 
because lenders cannot use the prohibited mort-
gage terms to cover costs. With more of the cost 
of the mortgage reflected in the APR, it should be 
easier for consumers to understand the costs of the 
loan and to comparison shop effectively. Creditors 
would then tend to compete more on price and less 
on other factors, factors that consumers have dif-
ficulty evaluating. Product regulation could then, 
under some circumstances, enhance the effective-
ness of disclosure regimes.
HOEPA, however, is decidedly underinclusive: it is 
designed to curb abusive practices at the fringe of 
lending rather than to overcome broader failures. 
Moreover, as a practical matter HOEPA’s record 
has been mixed at best (e.g., HUD-Treasury 2000). 
In response, in June 2000 a HUD-Treasury report 
proposed a four-part approach to curbing preda-
tory lending (Barr 2005a; HUD-Treasury). Quite 
recently, the Federal Reserve Board unveiled ma-
jor changes to its HOEPA and TILA rules.13 Many 
other improvements to abusive practice regulation 
are desirable and may now be forthcoming given 
the fallout from the subprime mortgage-lending 
crisis. Congress is currently considering antipreda-
tory lending legislation.14 
In addition to the federal regulatory landscape, 
many states have passed new antipredatory lending 
laws or have enhanced existing laws (Bostic, Engel, 
McCoy, Pennington-Cross, and Wachter 2007; Ho 
and Pennington-Cross 2006; Li and Ernst 2006). 
Many of these laws are modeled on the federal 
HOEPA legislation but increase coverage, enhance 
restrictions, or bolster enforcement (Bostic et al. 
2007). A vigorous debate exists about whether these 
state laws diminish access to credit and harm con-
sumers, or whether these laws diminish access to 
credit that ought not to be provided, and thus in-
crease consumer welfare. Bostic and his colleagues 
find that the broader coverage of these laws tends 
to increase subprime origination but that increased 
restrictions and enforcement tend to diminish such 
12. Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-325, § 151, 108 Stat. 2190 (1994): codified at 15 U.S.C. (2000), § 
1601.
13.  See Federal Reserve Board, Final Rule Amending Regulation Z, 12 CFR Part 226 (July 14, 2008); “Summary of Findings: Consumer Test-
ing of Mortgage Broker Disclosures,” submitted to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, July 10, 2008; Federal Reserve 
Board, “Proposed Rule Amending Regulation Z,” 12 CFR Part 226 (June 14, 2007), Federal Register 72, No. 114: 32948; “Design and 
Testing of Effective Truth in Lending Disclosures,” submitted to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (May 16, 2007).
14.  See, for example, Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007, H.R. 3915, 110th Cong., 1st sess.
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originations. The empirical debate about the scope 
and effectiveness of these provisions is likely to 
continue.
In principle, overly prescriptive product regula-
tions can diminish financial access and harm prod-
uct competition and innovation that might serve 
low-income households. Governments may easily 
err by restricting products that would be advanta-
geous or by creating consumer confusion through 
complicated rules regarding product regulation. Fi-
nancial markets change rapidly and firms can easily 
innovate in ways that are not anticipated by gov-
ernment regulators. Such innovations could serve 
consumers better than do government-imposed 
product regulations. Conversely, such innovations 
could help firms evade government regulations to 
the detriment of consumers. It is difficult to know 
in advance how market innovations will interrelate 
with product regulations, but for many reasons gov-
ernment regulators may not be able to keep up with 
these changes. The trade-offs inherent in product 
regulation should be considered, as should alterna-
tive forms of regulation.
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With the background on home mortgage regulation established, we turn next to the particular dynamic between indi-
vidual behavior and industrial organization in that 
market. Recent behavioral research promises to 
enrich our understanding of the tensions outlined 
above by providing a more-nuanced and faithful 
rendition of the psychological and organizational 
facts that characterize people’s relevant behaviors. 
We first consider some of the major behavioral 
insights. We then briefly discuss the promise of 
behavioral regulation and the limitations of be-
havioral regulation that does not take account of 
market structure. Next, we turn to the industrial 
organization of the mortgage market as it relates 
to behavioral patterns. We develop a model of the 
interaction between individual psychology and in-
dustrial organization and illustrate how it should 
affect regulatory choice.
A Deeper Look at Insights from 
Behavioral research
How firms will respond to regulation is bound to 
depend on people’s perceptions and behaviors to 
which firms respond in their marketing and in the 
products and services they offer. Understanding 
people’s behaviors promises to give a clearer picture 
of the contour of market forces and of the problems 
regulation is attempting to solve.
Behavioral research paints a quite different picture 
of the average citizen from the picture typically en-
visioned in economic policy circles, with significant 
implications for policy design and implementation. 
The classical, rational agent model assumes ac-
tors with well-ordered preferences and calibrated 
judgments who are well informed, maximize their 
self-interested well-being via tangible rewards, and 
make coherent and insightful plans, which they 
pursue with efficiency and self-control. In contrast, 
behavioral research finds people are quite differ-
ent: their preferences are malleable, their judg-
ment prone to predictable heuristics and biases, 
their interests often neither selfish nor material, 
and their plans and behaviors often more context 
dependent than planned and calculating. What is 
notable about the emerging behavioral picture is 
that it paints people as not merely confused and er-
ror prone, but also as driven by tendencies that are 
systematic and predictable yet profoundly differ-
ent from those typically envisioned by the rational 
model. A better understanding of such tendencies, 
appropriately applied, promises to yield policies that 
are more successful. In the words of John Maurice 
Clark almost a hundred years ago, “The economist 
[policy analyst] may attempt to ignore psychology, 
but it is sheer impossibility for him to ignore hu-
man nature. . . . If the economist [policy analyst] 
borrows his conception of man from the psycholo-
gist, his constructive work may have some chance 
of remaining purely economic in character. But if 
he does not, he will not thereby avoid psychology. 
Rather, he will force himself to make his own, and 
it will be bad psychology” (Clark 1918).
Consider, for example, such central notions as de-
cisional conflict, information, learning, and plan-
ning. Each plays an important role in behavior but 
deviates in important ways from what is typically 
assumed by the normative account. Understanding 
these notions and how individual actions can differ 
from what is typically assumed is necessary in order 
to craft effective policy. In what follows, we address 
these notions in subsections that focus on decisional 
conflict, the role of contextual factors, knowledge, 
and attention, and what social psychologists call 
“channel factors.”
Decisional Conflict
People’s preferences are typically constructed, not 
merely revealed, during the decisionmaking pro-
cess; the construction of preferences is influenced 
by the nature and the context of decision, with im-
3. psychology and Industrial Organization
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portant implications. Consider, for example, the 
role of decisional conflict. Because preferences need 
to be constructed, choices can be hard to make. 
People often look for a good reason, a compelling 
rationale, for choosing one option over another. At 
times, compelling rationales are easy to find and ar-
ticulate; at other times, no easy rationale presents 
itself, which can make the conflict between op-
tions hard to resolve. Decisional conflict can prove 
aversive and can lead people to postpone decisions 
or to opt for a default option, generating prefer-
ence patterns that are fundamentally different from 
those predicted by classical accounts based on value 
maximization.
According to the classical analysis, each option is 
assigned a subjective value or utility and the deci-
sionmaker chooses the option assigned the highest 
utility. Such analysis does not anticipate decisional 
conflict and assumes that having more alternatives 
is a good thing since the more options there are, the 
more likely the consumer is to find one that satisfies 
her utility function.
Instead, a proliferation of alternatives can dissuade 
consumers from making the most favorable choice. 
As choice becomes more difficult, decisions are de-
ferred, often indefinitely (Iyengar and Lepper 2000; 
Shafir, Simonson, and Tversky 1993; Tversky and 
Shafir 1992). This has been documented in deci-
sions ranging from choosing jams in upscale grocery 
stores (Iyengar and Lepper 2000) to applying for a 
loan equal to roughly one-third of the applicant’s 
income (Bertrand, Karlan, Mullainathan, Shafir, 
and Zinman 2007) to participating in retirement 
savings plans, which drops as the number of fund 
options offered increases (Iyengar, Huberman, and 
Jiang 2004). Furthermore, the tendency to refrain 
from making a choice gives an uncanny advantage 
to the default, or the perceived status quo. This has 
been observed in several naturally occurring experi-
ments. For example, New Jersey and Pennsylvania 
both introduced the option of a limited right to sue 
in the context of insurance decisions, entitling au-
tomobile drivers to lower insurance rates. The two 
states differed in what was offered as the default op-
tion: New Jersey motorists needed to acquire the 
full right to sue (transaction costs were minimal: 
a signature), whereas Pennsylvania motorists had 
the full right to sue as the default, which could be 
forfeited in favor of the limited alternative. Only 
about 20 percent of New Jersey drivers chose to 
acquire the full right to sue, whereas approximately 
75 percent of Pennsylvania drivers chose to retain 
it, which had substantial financial repercussions 
(Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros, and Kunreuther 
1993). A second naturally occurring experiment was 
recently observed in Europeans’ decisions with re-
gard to membership in organ donor pools (Johnson 
and Goldstein 2003). In opt-out countries, drivers 
are by default organ donors unless they elect not to 
be; in opt-in countries they are by default not donors 
unless they choose to be. Effective rates of partici-
pation in organ donor pools are almost 98 percent 
in the former countries and about 15 percent in the 
latter, a remarkable difference, given the low trans-
action costs and the significance of the decision.
Such patterns suggest that minor contextual chang-
es can alter what consumers choose in ways that are 
unlikely to relate to their ultimate utility. Of course, 
the fact that consumers are influenced by conflict 
and context need not immediately imply that choic-
es ought to be taken away from them or even that 
the number of available alternatives ought to be re-
stricted. It does suggest, however, that a prolifera-
tion of alternatives needs to be considered with care 
rather than seen as an obvious advantage. It also 
suggests that the default outcome, which acquires 
a privileged status by being the default—rather 
than being a mere formality that can be effortlessly 
changed—needs to be chosen thoughtfully. In ef-
fect, when a large array of options, including the 
option of choosing the status quo, are inappropri-
ately handled (intentionally or not) substantial dec-
rement in consumers’ welfare can result. A prolif-
eration of complicated decisions in the mortgage 
market, for example, can lead to quite bad outcomes 
for borrowers.
Context Dependent preferences 
Individual preferences are significantly more com-
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 plicated and local than the rational conception. 
People often are weak at predicting their future 
tastes or at learning from past experience (Kahn-
eman 1994), and their choices can be influenced 
by anticipated regret (Bell 1982), by costs already 
incurred (Arkes and Blumer 1985; Gourville and 
Soman 1998), and by effects of sequencing and 
temporal separation where high-discount rates for 
future as compared to present outcomes can yield 
dynamically inconsistent preferences (Loewenstein 
and Elster 1992; Loewenstein and Thaler 1989). 
Contrary to standard assumptions, the psychologi-
cal carriers of value are perceived gains and losses 
and not anticipated final states of wealth, and at-
titudes toward risk tend to shift from risk aversion 
in the face of gains to risk seeking what appear as 
losses (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Moreover, 
people are loss averse—that is, they perceive that 
the loss associated with giving up a good is sub-
stantially greater than the utility associated with 
obtaining it (Tversky and Kahneman 1991). This, 
in turn, leads to reluctance to depart from the sta-
tus quo because things to be renounced are valued 
more highly than comparable things to be gained 
(Knetsch 1989; Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988).
People use intuitive mental accounting schemes in 
which they compartmentalize wealth and spend-
ing into distinct budget categories such as savings, 
rent, and entertainment, and into separate mental 
accounts such as current income, assets, and future 
income (Thaler 1985, 1992). Contrary to standard 
fungibility assumptions, people exhibit different de-
grees of willingness to spend from various accounts, 
yielding consumption patterns that are sensitive to 
labels, overly dependent on current income, and 
often problematic, such as saving at a low interest 
rate while concurrently borrowing at a high rate 
(Ausubel 1991).
Common to these patterns is the highly local and 
context-dependent nature of consumer decisions. 
Standard thinking envisions preferences that are 
largely impervious to minor contextual nuances. 
In contrast, people’s choices are heavily context de-
pendent, with the option chosen not infrequently 
being one that would have been forgone had the 
context differed by just a little, often in trivial ways. 
What this means is that people’s choices are often 
at the mercy of chance as well as of intentional ma-
nipulation. These choices merit careful consider-
ation, particularly in contexts with potentially seri-
ous consequences.
Knowledge, Attention, and Intention
A standard assumption is that consumers are at-
tentive, knowledgeable, and typically able to avail 
themselves of important information. Instead, con-
sumers across a wide range of income and education 
levels are often ignorant of options, program rules, 
benefits, and opportunities. Surveys show that fewer 
than one-fifth of investors (in stocks, bonds, funds, 
or other securities) can be considered financially 
literate (Alexander, Jones, and Nigro 1998); similar 
findings describe the understanding shown by pen-
sion plan participants (Schultz 1995). Indeed, even 
older beneficiaries often do not know what kind of 
pension they are set to receive or what mix of stocks 
and bonds they own.
Cognitive load, defined as the amount of information 
attended to, has been shown to affect performance 
in a variety of tasks. When consumers find them-
selves in situations that are unfamiliar, distracting, 
tense, or even stigmatizing (such as applying for a 
loan), all of which tend to consume cognitive and 
emotional resources, fewer resources remain avail-
able to process information relevant to the decision 
at hand. As a result, decisions may become even 
more dependent on situational cues and irrelevant 
considerations. This is observed, for example, in 
studies of low-literacy consumers who apparently 
struggle with trade-offs between effort and accura-
cy, are overly dependent on peripheral cues in prod-
uct advertising and packaging, and show systematic 
withdrawal from market interactions (Adkins and 
Ozanne 2005).
More generally, information cannot be equated 
with knowledge. People often do not fully process 
imminently available data because of limitations in 
attention, understanding, perceived relevance, or 
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their ability to remember. Program designers often 
do not appreciate this, having been trained to think 
that people know what is important and knowable.
An important theme in behavioral research with 
profound consequences for thinking about policy is 
the systematic discrepancy between intention and 
action, which is essentially assumed away in analyses 
of rational behavior. Just because a person recogniz-
es and has every intention of doing the right thing 
often does not bring about the intended action. 
Even when intentions are genuine and strong, self-
control problems, poor planning, lack of attention, 
and forgetting can all intercede. On the flip side and 
for similar reasons, actions may be taken that were 
genuinely unintended, thus violating the notion of 
revealed preference. A degree of self-knowledge, in 
turn, leads people to take precautions against such 
tendencies, which can lead to unintended conse-
quences when policies are designed with different 
creatures in mind.
Channel Factors
The pressures exerted by situational factors can con-
stitute restraining forces that are hard to overcome 
or can create inducing forces that can be harnessed 
to great effect. In contrast with massive interven-
tions that often prove ineffectual, seemingly minor 
situational changes can have a large impact. Kurt 
Lewin, who coined the term channel factors (Lewin 
1951), suggests that certain behaviors can be facili-
tated by opening a channel, whereas other behav-
iors can be blocked by closing a channel. Leventhal, 
Singer, and Jones (1965) document an illustrative 
example of a channel factor: their subjects received 
persuasive communications about the risks of teta-
nus and the value of inoculation and were then in-
vited to go to the campus infirmary for a tetanus 
shot. Follow-up surveys showed that the communi-
cation was effective in changing beliefs and attitudes. 
Nonetheless, only 3 percent actually took the step 
of getting themselves inoculated compared with 28 
percent of those who received the same communi-
cation but also were given a map of the campus with 
the infirmary circled and were urged to decide on a 
particular time to go and a route to get them there. 
Along these lines, Koehler and Poon (2005) argue 
that people’s predictions of their future behavior 
overweight the strength of their current intentions 
and underweight contextual factors that influence 
the likelihood that those intentions will translate 
into action. This can generate systematically mis-
guided plans among consumers who, reassured by 
their good intentions, proceed to put themselves in 
situations that are powerful enough to make them 
act and choose otherwise.
Behavioral research highlights a simple fact that is 
both terribly trivial and extremely profound: peo-
ple choose between, act toward, and exercise judg-
ment about things as they are mentally represented 
and not about things as they are in the real world. 
In addition, the relationship between extensional 
outcome and internal representation is rarely one 
to one. Instead, options are construed, elaborated 
on, and contextually interpreted in ways that are 
both systematic and consequential.
Framing, context effects, and channel factors are 
some of the features of the construal process with 
important policy implications. The take-up of a 
program, for example, will depend on whether it 
is construed as the default or as a departure from 
the status quo, whether others are thought to have 
adopted it, or whether it requires what is perceived 
as a difficult choice from among an array of alterna-
tives or, instead, it is perceived as an easy choice.
the promise and Limitations of 
Behavioral regulation
Recent behavioral work, particularly in the area 
of savings, has shown the promise of behaviorally 
informed regulation—regulation that is motivated 
directly by specific psychological insights, including 
of the types discussed above. The research suggests 
that individual choice can be profoundly affected by 
psychological constructs such as mental accounting, 
anchoring, endowment effects, and framing; these 
constructs can make a big difference to outcomes. 
Building on these insights, among other things, re-
cent policy innovations have exploited the power of 
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 defaults in determining, for example, whether and 
how much individuals will save through contribu-
tions to 401(k) plans.
In a study of elective enrollment in one firm’s re-
tirement plan (Madrian and Shea 2001), employees 
who joined the firm had to fill out a form to par-
ticipate in the savings plan. Although the plan was 
quite lucrative, participation was low, and a simple 
feature of the program was then changed: prior to 
the change, the enrollment form required people to 
opt-in (“Check this box if you would like to partici-
pate”). After the change, new employees received 
a form that required of them to “Check this box if 
you would like not to have 3 percent of your pay 
check put into a 401(k) plan.” The effect of this nu-
anced manipulation was large. As the default option 
changed from “no contribution” to “contribution,” 
take-up rates increased from 38 to 86 percent. Sev-
eral years later, those exposed to the contribution 
default still showed higher contribution rates. More 
and more employers have been adopting automatic 
features, and the Pension Protection Act of 2006 
includes a number of features specifically crafted to 
encourage opt-out defaults in savings plans. If em-
ployers are required to enroll workers in automatic 
retirement plans unless the worker affirmatively 
opts out of participating, there is good reason to 
expect enrollment rates to be higher and net savings 
to increase.
Behavioral principles have figured prominently 
in recent attempts at even more constructive sav-
ings applications. Save More Tomorrow (SMarT), 
a program intended to increase retirement savings, 
deposits money into savings out of future salary 
raises rather than out of current income, with the 
added proviso that one can withdraw from the pro-
gram at any time. The program relies on basic be-
havioral regularities—future discounting, nominal 
loss aversion, and status quo bias—to generate sub-
stantial increases in retirement savings. It has been 
adopted by many employers, affecting the lives of 
millions in the United States and abroad (Benartzi 
and Thaler forthcoming; Iwry and John 2006; Tha-
ler and Benartzi 2004).
Similar types of policies can be pursued across a 
range of financial products and services that reach 
low-income households. By further extension from 
the retirement literature, employers could be re-
quired to deposit workers’ income checks directly 
into a low-cost bank account with an automatic sav-
ings plan unless the worker opts out of the arrange-
ment. Governments could make tax refund and 
benefit payments through direct deposit into a safe 
and affordable bank account with savings features, 
again unless the beneficiary opts out (Barr 2007).
Our starting point, however, is that opt-out rules 
and other such examples may be limited in their 
scope of application. Consider the common opt-out 
experience of signing a rental car contract. Individu-
als actively opt out of many features of a rental con-
tract but do so almost automatically when the agent 
tells them to “Initial here, here, and here.” Although 
opting out may be effective in the lack of a strong 
market pressure, it is far too easily overcome by the 
firm who interacts directly with the consumer. This 
raises the more basic question, “What would behav-
ioral regulation look like in a richer context, where 
we consider the ability of the firm to respond to this 
regulation, and potentially to undo or magnify it?” 
To understand the interaction between behavior-
ally informed regulation and market forces, we turn 
to industrial organization.
Industrial Organization: How market 
Forces Can undermine or reinforce 
Behaviorally Informed regulation
In theory, market forces help push private sector 
actors to offer the best products at the lowest prices. 
The theory, however, depends crucially on assump-
tions of rationality. In the classic economic model, 
the setup is this: free competition for the provision 
of goods and services to consumers who obtain full 
information, understand the information they re-
ceive, and act based on that full information. Mar-
ket actors are restrained from peddling welfare-re-
ducing products by consumers who demand better. 
In practice and in some contexts, as we have seen, 
the market has produced products and services that 
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are suboptimal. It is easier to see why market forces 
sometimes may not produce optimal products and 
services once one relaxes the assumptions underly-
ing the classic model.
Returning to the opt-out regulation, the presump-
tion is that individuals fail to maximize their own 
utility because of temporal inconsistency—they 
would like to save but fail to do so. Opt-out regula-
tion eases this problem by facilitating savings even 
among those who do nothing (perhaps because of 
procrastination). What are firm (employer) incen-
tives in this case? Employers appear to be largely 
indifferent or perhaps even motivated to decrease 
the bias against savings.15 This incentive is crucial.
But in some markets firms have incentives to con-
found consumers (Gabaix and Laibson 2006). In 
posting prices, for example, firms have strong mar-
ket and private incentives to hide certain prices. If 
consumers are sorted into those who understand 
complicated offers and those who do not, it is diffi-
cult for firms to compete by offering the most trans-
parent products if such products are less profitable. 
Consumers who understand bad deals already avoid 
them and will shun the new offer; consumers who 
do not understand them and go for the new, bet-
ter offer will just lower profits for the firm (Gabaix 
and Laibson 2006). This result—that transparency 
does not always pay off for firms because people 
are fallible and easily misled—illustrates how firms 
sometimes have strong incentives to exacerbate 
psychological biases. Regulation in this case faces 
a much more difficult challenge than in the savings 
situation.
This distinction in market responses to individual 
psychology is central to our framework; it is illus-
trated in Table 1. In some cases, the market is either 
neutral or wants to overcome consumer fallibility. 
In other cases, the market would like to exploit or 
exaggerate consumer fallibility. Thus, when con-
sumers misunderstand compounding of interest 
in the context of saving, banks have incentives to 
reduce this misunderstanding so that they can in-
crease their deposits. When consumers misunder-
stand compounding in the context of borrowing, 
lenders have little incentive to remove this misun-
derstanding because it can only decrease the debts 
they are able to issue.16 When consumers procras-
tinate in signing up for the EITC (and hence in fil-
ing their tax returns), private tax preparation firms 
have incentives to help remove this procrastination 
to increase their customer base. When consumers 
procrastinate in sending in requests for rebates (but 
make retail purchases as if they are going to receive 
a rebate), retailers benefit. Note the parallelism in 
these examples: firm incentives to alleviate or ex-
ploit a bias are not an intrinsic feature of the bias 
itself. Instead, they are a function of how the bias 
plays itself out in the particular market structure.
15.  This is largely because of the existing regulatory framework—pension regulation gives employers at least some incentive to enroll lower-
income individuals in 401(k) programs. Absent this, it is likely that firms would be happy to discourage enrollment because they often 
must pay the match for these individuals. Even with the incentive, the pension structure creates far-from-perfect alignment of public and 
private interests in enrolling workers. This point is interesting because it suggests that even defaults in savings work only because some 
other regulation changed the scoring of the game.
16. This stylized example abstracts from collection issues.
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In the consumer credit market, one worries that 
many firm-individual interactions are of the kind 
where firms seek to exploit rather than to alleviate 
bias. If true, this raises the concern of overextrapo-
lating from the example of 401(k) defaults to credit 
products. To the extent that 401(k) defaults work 
because optimal behavior is largely aligned with 
market incentives, other areas such as credit mar-
kets might be more difficult to regulate with mere 
defaults. Furthermore, if the credit market is domi-
nated by low-road firms offering opaque products 
that prey on human weakness, it is more likely that 
regulators of such a market will be captured, that 
market forces will defeat positive defaults sets, and 
that low-road players will continue to dominate. 
Many observers believe that the credit markets are, 
in fact, currently dominated by such low-road firms 
(e.g., Bar-Gill 2004; Mann 2007) and that players 
that were formerly high-road players have come to 
adopt the sharp practices of their low-road compet-
itors. If government policymakers want to attempt 
to use defaults in such contexts, they might need to 
deploy stickier defaults or more-aggressive policy 
options.
Table 2 illustrates a conceptual approach to the is-
sue of regulatory choice. The regulator can either 
change the rules of the game or change the scor-
ing of the game. Setting a default is an example 
of changing the rules of the game, as is disclosure 
regulation. Specifically, the rules of the game are 
changed when there’s an attempt to change the 
nature of firm-individual interactions, as when the 
regulation attempts to affect what can be said, of-
fered, or done. Changing the scoring of the game, 
by contrast, changes the payoffs a firm will receive 
for particular outcomes. Pension regulation that pe-
nalizes firms whose 401(k) plan enrollment is top 
heavy with high-paid executives is an example of 
how scoring gives firms incentives to enroll low-
income individuals without setting particular rules 
on how this is done.
 Behavioral fallibility market neutral, or wants to  market exploits consumer fallibility 
  overcome consumer fallibility
 Consumers misunderstand  Consumers misunderstand  Consumers misunderstand 
 compounding compounding in savings.  compounding in borrowing.
  ➞	Banks would like to reduce  ➞	Banks would like to exploit 
   this to increase savings base.   this to increase borrowing.
 Consumers procrastinate Consumers procrastinate  Consumers procrastinate 
  in signing up for EITC.   in sending in requests for rebates.
  ➞	Tax filing companies would  ➞	Retailers would like to 
   like to reduce this to   exploit this to increase   
   increase customer base.  revenues. 
   
tABLe 1 
the Firm and the Individual
tABLe 2 
Changing the game
rules • Set the defaults in 401(k) savings 
 • Set the default for organ donation 
Scoring • Penalties for 401(k) enrollment that is 
  top heavy with high-salary employees 
 • grants to states that enroll organ   
  donors
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Table 3 weaves together these different dimensions, 
illustrating how regulatory choice ought to be 
analyzed according to the market’s stance toward 
human fallibility. In what follows, we discuss the 
specific application of these forces to the case of 
mortgage markets with an example in the form of 
an opt-out mortgage system. Among other things, 
the discussion illustrates how policies in the top-
right-hand corner of Table 3 face a particular chal-
lenge. Changing the rules of the game alone will 
be difficult when firms are highly motivated to find 
work-arounds. When we suggest below opt-out 
policies in mortgages, the challenge will be to find 
ways to make these starting positions sticky so that 
firms do not simply undo their default nature. In 
our judgment, both achieving a good default and 
figuring out how to make it work requires separat-
ing low-road from high-road firms and making it 
profitable for high-road firms to offer the default 
product (for a related concept, see Kennedy 2005). 
For that to work, the default must be sufficiently 
attractive to consumers and sufficiently profitable 
for high-road firms to succeed in offering it. In ad-
dition, penalties associated with deviations from 
the default must be sufficiently costly to make the 
default stick even in the face of market pressures 
from low-road firms. It may be that in some credit 
markets low-road firms have become so dominant 
that sticky defaults will be ineffectual. Moreover, 
achieving such a default is likely more costly than 
making defaults work when market incentives align, 
not least because the costs associated with the sticki-
ness of the default involve dead-weight losses, given 
that there will be those for whom deviating from the 
default is optimal. These losses would need to be 
weighed against the losses from the current system, 
as well as against losses from alternative approaches 
such as disclosure or product regulation. Nonethe-
less, given the considerations above it seems worth 
exploring whether such sticky defaults can help to 
change the rules of the game.
The default example is just one of a set of exam-
ples we explore elsewhere as potential regulatory 
interventions based on our conceptual framework. 
As noted above, given market responses to relevant 
psychological factors in different contexts, regula-
tion may need to take a variety of forms. These forms 
include some that, while informed by psychology, 
are designed not to affect behavioral change but 
rather to alter the structure of the market in which 
relevant choices are made. Given the complexities 
involved, the purpose of this paper is not to cham-
pion a specific opt-out mortgage policy. Instead, we 
illustrate how a behaviorally informed regulatory 
analysis would lead to a deeper understanding of the 
costs and benefits of specific policies. We explore 
one idea to implement an opt-out mortgage policy 
in order to illustrate our conceptual approach.
tABLe 3 
Behaviorally Informed regulation
 market neutral or wants to  market exploits consumer fallibility 
 overcome consumer fallibility
rules • Public education on saving • Opt-out mortgage system
 • Direct deposit or auto-save • Information debiasing on debt through framing, salience
 • Licensing of brokers
Scoring • Tax incentives for savings vehicles  • Penalties to make the opt-out system sticky 
  for the poor • Ex post liability standard for truth in lending 
   • Broker fiduciary duty, or changing compensation  
    (banning yield spread premiums)
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While the causes of the mortgage crisis are myriad, a central problem is that many borrowers took out loans that they did 
not understand and could not afford. Brokers and 
lenders offered loans that looked much less ex-
pensive than they really were because of low ini-
tial monthly payments and hidden, costly features. 
Families commonly make mistakes in taking out 
home mortgages because they are misled by broker 
sales tactics, misunderstand the complicated terms 
and financial trade-offs in mortgages, wrongly 
forecast their own behavior, and misperceive their 
risks of borrowing. How many homeowners really 
understand how the teaser rate, introductory rate, 
and reset rate relate to the London interbank of-
fered rate plus some specified margin, or can judge 
whether the prepayment penalty will offset the 
gains from the teaser rate?
Improved disclosures might help. Altering the rules 
of the game of disclosure and altering the “scor-
ing” for seeking to evade proper disclosure may 
be sufficient to reduce the worst outcomes. How-
ever, if market pressures and consumer confusion 
are sufficiently strong, such disclosure may not be 
enough. If market complexity is sufficiently disrup-
tive to consumer choice, product regulation might 
prove most appropriate. For example, by barring 
prepayment penalties, one could reduce lock-in to 
bad mortgages; by barring short-term adjustable 
rate mortgages (ARMs) and balloon payments, 
one could reduce refinance pressure. In both cases, 
more of the cost of the loan would be pushed into 
interest rates and competition could focus on price. 
Price competition would benefit consumers, who 
would be more likely to understand the terms on 
which lenders are competing. Product regulation 
would also reduce cognitive and emotional pres-
sures related to potentially bad decisionmaking. 
However, product regulation may stifle beneficial 
innovation; there is always also the possibility that 
government may simply get it wrong.
For that reason, we propose a new form of regula-
tion. For lack of a better term, we call this a sticky 
opt-out mortgage system. As with opt-out regula-
tion generally, a sticky opt out-system would fall, in 
terms of stringency, somewhere between product 
regulation and disclosure. For reasons we explain 
below, however, market forces would likely swamp 
a pure opt-out regime—that’s where the need for 
stickiness comes in. We propose that a default be 
established with increased liability exposure for de-
viations that harm consumers. This approach cor-
responds to a combination of changing the rules of 
the game (top-right-hand corner of Table 3) and 
changing liability rules (bottom-right-hand corner 
of that table).
The proposal is grounded in our equilibrium model 
of firm incentives and individual psychology. Bor-
rowers may be unable to distinguish among com-
plex loan products and may be unable to act opti-
mally based on such an understanding (e.g., Ausubel 
1991). We thus deploy an opt-out strategy to make 
it easier for borrowers to choose a standard prod-
uct and harder for them to choose a product that 
they are less likely to understand. At the same time, 
lenders may seek to extract surplus from borrowers 
because of asymmetric information about future in-
come or default probabilities (Musto 2007). In the 
short term, lenders and brokers may benefit from 
selling borrowers loans that they cannot afford. 
Thus, as we outline next, a pure default would be 
undermined by firms; regulation needs to take ac-
count of this market pressure.
In our model, lenders would be required to offer 
eligible borrowers a standard mortgage or set of 
mortgages, such as a fixed rate, self-amortizing, 
thirty-year mortgage loan, according to reasonable 
underwriting standards. The precise contours of 
the standard set of mortgages would be set by reg-
ulation. Lenders would be free to charge whatever 
interest rate they wanted on the loan, and, subject 
4. An Opt Out mortgage policy
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to the constraints outlined below, could offer what-
ever other loan products they wanted outside of 
the standard package. Borrowers, however, would 
receive the standard mortgage offered, unless they 
chose to opt out in favor of a nonstandard option 
offered by the lender, after honest and comprehen-
sible disclosures from brokers or lenders about the 
risks of the alternative mortgages. An opt-out mort-
gage system would mean borrowers would be more 
likely to receive straightforward loans they could 
understand.
But a plain vanilla opt-out policy is likely to be in-
adequate. Unlike the savings context, where market 
incentives align well with policies to overcome be-
havioral biases, in the context of the credit markets 
firms often have an incentive to hide the true costs 
of borrowing. Given the strong market pressures 
to deviate from the default offer, we would need 
to require more than a simple opt out to make 
the default sticky enough to make a difference in 
outcomes. Deviation from the offer would require 
heightened disclosures and additional legal expo-
sure for lenders in order to make the default sticky. 
Under our plan, lenders would have stronger in-
centives to provide meaningful disclosures to those 
whom they convince to opt out because they would 
face increased regulatory scrutiny, or increased costs 
if the loans did not work out (for example, if the 
borrower defaults on the loan and seeks bankruptcy 
protection or the lender seeks foreclosure).
Future work will need to explore the enforcement 
mechanism in detail. For example, under one po-
tential approach to making the opt-out sticky, if de-
fault occurs when a borrower opts out the borrower 
could raise the lack of reasonable disclosure as a de-
fense to bankruptcy or foreclosure. Using an objec-
tive reasonableness standard akin to that used for 
warranty analysis under the Uniform Commercial 
Code, if the court determined that the disclosure 
would not effectively communicate the key terms 
and risks of the mortgage to the typical borrower, 
the court could modify or rescind the loan contract. 
Another alternative would be to have the banking 
agencies (or another expert consumer agency) en-
force the requirement, rather than relying on the 
courts to do so. The agency would be responsible 
for supervising the nature of disclosures according 
to a reasonableness standard and would impose 
a fine on the lender and order corrective actions 
if the disclosures were found to be unreasonable. 
The precise nature of the stickiness required and 
the trade-offs involved in imposing these costs on 
lenders would need to be explored in greater detail, 
but in principle a sticky opt-out policy could effec-
tively leverage the behavioral insight that defaults 
matter with the industrial organizational insight 
that certain market incentives work against a pure 
opt-out policy.
An opt-out mortgage system with stickiness might 
provide several benefits over the current market out-
comes. Under the plan, a plain vanilla set of default 
mortgages with standard terms would be easier to 
compare across mortgage offers. Information could 
be more efficiently transmitted across the market. 
Consumers are likely to understand the key terms 
and features of such standard products better than 
they would alternative mortgage products. Price 
competition is more likely to be salient once fea-
tures are standardized. Behaviorally, once the alter-
native products are introduced, the consumer will 
be made aware that such alternatives represent devi-
ations from the default, helping to anchor consumer 
decisionmaking and providing some basic expecta-
tions for what ought to enter into consumer choice. 
Framing the mortgage choice as one between ac-
cepting standard mortgage offers and needing af-
firmatively to choose nonstandard products should 
improve consumer decisionmaking. Creditors will 
be required to make heightened disclosures about 
the risks of the alternative loan products for the 
borrower, subject to legal sanction in the event of 
failure to disclose reasonably such risks. The legal 
sanctions should deter creditors from making high-
ly unreasonable alternative offers, with hidden and 
complicated terms. Consumers may be less likely 
to make significant mistakes. The approach would 
allow lenders to continue to develop new kinds of 
mortgages, but only when they can adequately ex-
plain key terms and risks to borrowers.
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 Moreover, requiring a default to be offered, ac-
companied by required heightened disclosures and 
increased legal exposure for deviations, may help to 
make high-road lending more profitable in relation 
to low-road lending. If offering an opt-out mortgage 
product helps to split the market between high- and 
low-road firms and rewards the former, the market 
may shift (back) toward firms that offer home mort-
gage products that better serve borrowers. For this 
to work effectively, the default and the efforts to 
make the default sticky would need to distinguish 
the typical good loan (benefiting both lender and 
borrower) from a variety of bad loans—e.g., those 
that benefit the lender but harm the borrower, those 
that benefit the borrower but harm the lender, and 
those that harm the borrower and lender but ben-
efit third parties, such as brokers.
There will be costs associated with requiring an 
opt-out home mortgage. For example, the sticky 
defaults may not be sticky enough to alter out-
comes given market pressures. Implementation of 
the measure may be costly and the disclosure re-
quirement and uncertainty regarding enforcement 
of the standard might reduce overall access to home 
mortgage lending. There may be too many cases in 
which alternative products are optimal so that the 
default product is in essence incorrect and comes 
to be seen as such. The default would then mat-
ter less over time; forcing firms and consumers to 
go through the process of deviating from it would 
become increasingly just another burden (like exist-
ing disclosure paperwork) along the road to getting 
a home mortgage loan. Low-income, minority, or 
first-time homeowners who have benefited from 
more-flexible underwriting and more-innovative 
mortgage developments might see their access re-
duced if the standard set of mortgages does not in-
clude products suitable to their needs.
One could improve these outcomes in a variety of 
ways. For example, the opt-out regulation could 
require that the standard set of mortgages include 
a thirty-year fixed mortgage, a five- or seven-year 
ARM, and straightforward mortgages designed to 
meet the particular needs of first-time, minority, 
or low-income homeowners. One might develop 
smart defaults based on key borrower characteris-
tics such as income and age. With a handful of key 
facts, an optimal default might be offered to an indi-
vidual borrower. The optimal default would consist 
of a mortgage or set of mortgages that most closely 
align with the set of mortgages that the typical bor-
rower with that income and age would prefer. For 
example, a borrower with rising income prospects 
might appropriately be offered a five-year ARM. 
Smart defaults might reduce error costs associated 
with the proposal and increase the range of mort-
gages that can be developed to meet the needs of a 
broad range of borrowers, including lower-income 
or first-time homeowners. Smart defaults may add 
to consumer confusion, however, when too many 
choice options exist across the market. Moreover, it 
may be difficult to design smart defaults consistent 
with fair lending rules.
Another approach to improve the standard mort-
gage choice set and to reduce enforcement costs 
over time would be to build in banking agency 
supervision as well as periodic required reviews of 
the defaults, with consumer experimental design or 
survey research to test the disclosures so that the 
opt-out product stays current with updated knowl-
edge of outcomes in the home mortgage market. 
Indeed, lenders might be required to conduct such 
research and to disclose the results to regulators and 
the public on developing a new product disclosure. 
Regulators might use the results of the research to 
provide safe harbors for disclosures that are shown 
to be reasonable ex ante through these methods. 
Regulators also could issue “no action” letters—
stating agency policy not to take enforcement ac-
tion against firms—regarding disclosures that are 
deemed through such research to be reasonable. 
The appropriate federal and state supervisory agen-
cies could be required to conduct ongoing super-
vision and testing of compliance with the opt-out 
regulations and disclosure requirements. The fed-
eral and state banking agencies could easily adapt 
to this additional role with respect to depositories, 
while the FTC, a new expert agency, or state agen-
cies would need to be provided with the author-
An Opt-Out HOme mOrtgAge SyStem
 www.HAMILTONPROJECT.ORg  |   SEPTEMBER 2008 25
ity and resources to conduct ongoing supervisory 
and testing functions for nondepositories instead 
of relying solely on enforcement actions. Through 
these “no action” letters, safe harbors, supervision, 
and other regulatory guidance, the regulators could 
develop a body of law that would increase compli-
ance across the diverse financial sectors involved in 
mortgage lending, while reducing the uncertainty 
facing lenders from the new opt-out requirement 
and providing greater freedom for financial inno-
vation.
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We have explored how existing regula-tion fails to take account of advances in behavioral research about how people 
think and act. By contrast, behaviorally informed 
regulation would take account of the importance 
of framing and defaults, of the gap between infor-
mation and understanding and between intention 
and action, as well as of other psychological fac-
tors affecting how people behave. At the same time, 
we argue, behaviorally informed regulation should 
take into account not only behavioral insights about 
individuals, but also economic insights about mar-
kets. Markets can be shown to systematically favor 
overcoming behavioral biases in some contexts and 
to systematically favor exploiting those biases in 
other contexts. A central illustration of this distinc-
tion is the contrast between the market for saving 
and the market for borrowing—in which the same 
human failing in understanding and acting on the 
concept of compound interest leads to opposite 
market reactions.
We have developed a model in which outcomes 
are an equilibrium interaction between individuals 
with specific psychologies and firms that respond to 
those psychologies within specific markets. To the 
extent that outcomes in this equilibrium contain 
serious social welfare failures, regulation could po-
tentially play a useful role. Taking both individuals 
and industrial organization seriously suggests the 
need for a range of market-context specific policy 
options, including changing both the rules of the 
game and its scoring. It is noteworthy that our cur-
rent framework largely retains the classical per-
spective of consumers interacting in competitive 
markets. The difference is that consumers are now 
presumed to be fallible in systematic and important 
ways that require insightful regulation to restore 
fair and healthy competition.
We have sketched here one policy suggestion de-
rived from our conceptual model.17 In particular, 
in the home mortgage market we have focused 
on a new, opt-out home mortgage system. Under 
the proposal, borrowers would be offered a stan-
dard set of mortgages with sound underwriting and 
straightforward terms—and that is the mortgage 
they would receive, unless they opted out. An opt-
out system would mean borrowers would be more 
likely to receive appropriate loans without blocking 
beneficial financial innovation. At the same time, 
market forces may work against the standard of-
ferings. Thus, we have suggested several alternative 
enforcement mechanisms for making the default 
sticky enough to influence the market. Further 
work will be required to explore which of these 
alternative enforcement approaches might merit 
enactment.
17.  We explore a range of such policy options in forthcoming work undertaken for the New America Foundation.
5. Conclusions
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